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The Failure of the Export Trading
Company Program
Spencer Weber Waller*
Ten years ago, Congress expressed concern over the massive
and growing United States trade deficit, the competitiveness of U.S.
firms in international markets, and the failure of small and medium
sized U.S. firms to take advantage of export markets. The antitrust
laws were identified as one of the principal culprits.' The antitrust
laws were criticized as too uncertain 2 and as imposing a competitive
* Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The author would like to thank
Jeffrey Aaronson, Craig Conrath, Stuart Chemtob, Leo Raskind, and Jeff Stempel for their
comments on aspects of this Article, and Andre Fiebig, Mark Whitney, and David Kim for
their research assistance. The research for this Article was supported by a summer re-
search grant from Brooklyn Law School.
I Congress identified restrictions on bank participation and investment in export
ventures as the other principal culprit. The 1982 legislation which is the focus of this
Article also permitted limited bank participation and ownership of export trading compa-
nies. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988).
The banking aspects of the legislation are not discussed in detail in this Article and are
analyzed in a separate body of literature. See Kenneth W. Wilson, The Bank Export Service
Act of 1982: How Can It be Fixed?, 102 BANKING L.J. 569 (1985); Thomas K. Dotzenrood, The
Bank Export Services Act: Deregulation Floundering in Compromise, 34 EMORY L.J. 455 (1985);
Nancy P. Jacklin, The Bank Export Services Act: The Legal Framework for Banking Organization
Investment in Export Trading Companies, 18 GEO. WASH.J. INT'L L. & ECON. 55 (1984); Donald
P. Seberger, The Banking Provisions of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 39 Bus. LAw.
475 (1984); Donna M. Petkanics, The Export Trading Company Act of 1982: Are Banks the An-
swer to Our Export Trading Problems?, 1 INT'L TAX. & Bus. LAw. 197 (1983); Eric R. Fisher et
al., Bank Holding Company Investment in Export Trading Companies, 2 B.U. INr'L L.J. 193
(1983); Cary Ferchill, Banks and the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 6 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 265 (1982).
2 See, e.g., Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Hearings on H. R. 2326 Before the Sub-
comm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 1st
Sess. 158 (1981)(statement of National Machine Tool Builders' Association); The Export
Trading Company Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 144 Before the Subcomm. on International Finance and
Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. at 34 (198 1)[hereinafter 1981 Senate Subcommittee Hearings](statement of Sen. Dan-
forth); Id. at 292, 345 (statement of Sen. Heinz); Export Trading Company Act of 1980: Hear-
ings on S. 2739, S.864, and Amendment No. 1674 to S.864 Before the Subcomm. on International
Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. at 3-4 (1980)[hereinafter 1980 Senate hearings](statement of Herbert A.
Gardner on Behalf of National Machine Tool Builders Association); Export Trading Compa-
nies and Trade Associations: Hearings on S. 864, S. 1499, S. 1663, and S. 1744 Before the Subcomm.
on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 [hereinafter 1979 Senate hearings](statement of Neil J.
Boyer, International Attorney Consultant).
The theme of uncertainty and the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws on United
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
disadvantage on U.S. firms competing against foreign firms not sub-
ject to similarly stringent national regulation. 3 The antitrust laws
were also believed to inhibit the formation of export joint ventures
and the type of export trading companies successfully used in other
countries.4
Congress responded to these concerns by proposing two modifi-
cations to the antitrust laws with respect to export conduct. Con-
gress proposed restricting jurisdiction in antitrust cases alleging a
violation solely with respect to exports. Congress also proposed a
more complex system where United States firms could apply in ad-
vance for certification that their export conduct was not a violation of
antitrust laws. Ultimately, both proposals were enacted into law in
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act ("FTAIA") 5 and the
Export Trading Company Act of 1982 ("ETC Act"). 6
Congress had numerous conflicting goals in enacting this legis-
lative package. Congress hoped to benefit from all of the alternative
export promotion bills being considered at the time, rather than hav-
ing to pick and choose among them. Congress hoped that the result-
ing legislation would: 1) encourage the formation of well financed
vertically integrated general trading companies along the line ofJap-
anese general trading companies ("sogoshosas") to assist United
States exporters with all aspects of the exporting process; 2) allow
competitors to jointly exploit market power abroad to offset the
power of private cartels and foreign government enterprises; and 3)
unleash a wave of export activity by small and medium sized firms
previously restrained by uncertainty over the application of U.S. anti-
trust laws.
After ten years, it is time to reexamine the Export Trading Com-
pany program ("ETC program") and assess its success or failure.
This Article suggests that Congress relied on empirical predictions
and industry arguments of dubious validity in attempting to restruc-
ture the export segment of the industry by altering antitrust princi-
States exports was one of the persistent themes raised by supporters of the Export Trad-
ing Company Act ("ETC Act"). The comments of the witnesses and legislators are re-
flected in the voluminous legislative history of the ETC Act which is collected in a nine
volume work, B. REAMS & M. NELSON, THE EXPORT TRADING COMPANY ACT OF 1982: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1989). In the interest of not restating all nine volumes of that legis-
lative history, the footnotes to this Article will provide only illustrative examples of the
common themes expressed in the consideration of the ETC Act and its predecessors.
3 See, e.g., Export Trading Companies, Trade Associations, and Trade Services: Hearings on S.
Rep. No. 27, Before the Senate Comm. on Banking & Housing & Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 22-23 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Senate Report] (correspondence from Sec. of Commerce
Malcolm Baldrige to Sen. Heinz).
4 See, e.g., 1981 Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 2, at 219-21 (statement of H.
Peter Guttman, President, HPG Associates)(disbanding of service joint venture because of
fear of private antitrust litigation despite receipt ofJustice Department opinion of no anti-
trust liability).
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 6(a), 45 (1988).
6 Id. §§ 4001-4003.
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pies which were never a substantial impediment in the first place.7
This Article further suggests that Congress was unable to clarify
what it wanted to accomplish in the export sector and enacted legis-
lation incapable of achieving any of its mutually contradictory goals.
This Article concludes that in implementing all of the competing
proposals, instead of choosing among them, Congress created a pro-
gram which created little incentive to export. Rather, the program
affirmatively injured the state of competition policy in both foreign
and domestic markets and the effectiveness of traditional antitrust
enforcement.
Part I of this Article sets forth the modifications of the antitrust
laws enacted in the name of promoting exports and reducing uncer-
tainty. Part II examines the negligible impact of the ETC Act on the
competitiveness of U.S. firms in the international market and on the
structure of the export sector of the U.S. economy. Part III examines
whether the ETC program has succeeded in reducing any actual or
perceived risks which the antitrust laws inject into the export deci-
sions of U.S. firms. Part IV explores the negative effects of the ETC
program on the substance and enforcement of U.S. antitrust policy.
Finally, Part V of this Article proposes the outright elimination or
modification of the ETC program to enhance U.S. export competi-
tiveness and lessen the damage to the U.S. enforcement of its anti-
trust law.
I. The Export Trading Act of 1982
Beginning in the 1970s, Congress began to focus its attention
on export promotion and the perception that the antitrust laws were
hindering U.S. export performance. 8 Congress proposed a series of
measures which would have established a commission to study the
international application of U.S. antitrust law, 9 broadened the dor-
7 Although beyond the scope of this Article, the legislative history and outcome of
the ETC Act is illustrative of many of the themes of modern public choice theory which
suggests that legislative intent, to the extent that it can be ascertained, reflects the private
interests of highly organzied interest groups engaged in rent seeking behavior, rather than
the intent of legislators seeking to implement broad based conceptions of the public inter-
est. See William N. Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for
Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988); Robert O. Tollison, Public Choice and Legis-
lation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 (1988); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of
Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 873 (1987); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding
Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223
(1986); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domain, 50 U. Cu. L. REV. 533 (1983); Richard A.
Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHi. L. REV.
263 (1982).
8 See generally B. REAMS & M. NELSON, supra note 2. The first such effort appears to be
S. 2754, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
9 The Commission on the International Application ofthe U.S. Antitrust Laws Act: Hearings on
S. 432 Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1981).
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mant Webb-Pomerene antitrust export exemption,' 0 permitted bank
ownership of export trading companies, " provided exporters with a
preclearance procedure to determine their antitrust liability in ad-
vance, 12 promoted the formation of American export trading compa-
nies along the lines of Japanese sogoshosas,13 and amended the
jurisdictional provisions of the antitrust laws regarding exports from
the U.S. ' 4
A. Expectations and Legislative Choices
The ideas culminating in the ETC Act were initially proposed in
1979. The momentum for the ultimate passage of an ETC Act was
provided by a 1981 study conducted by Chase Econometrics. The
Chase Econometrics' study indicated that the passage of such legisla-
tion would, by 1985, (1) increase Gross National Product between
$27 billion and $55 billion, (2) increase domestic employment be-
tween 320,000 and 640,000, and (3) reduce the federal deficit to $22
billion.' 5 An ETC Act was thus politically appealing as a painless
export promotion vehicle narrowing the trade deficit, while at the
same time, increasing domestic employment.' 6 Congressional en-
10 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1799, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982); H.R. 7463, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1980).
The Webb-Pomerene Act permits exporters to form export associations which are
exempt from the Sherman Act. In order to qualify for Webb-Pomerene immunity, the
association must be engaged solely in export trade and may not interfere with domestic
competition or the export trade of a domestic competitor. The Webb-Pomerene Act does
not cover services. Webb-Pomerene Associations must register with the Federal Trade
Commission and file periodic reports. Webb-Pomerene Associations remain subject to
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, but are immune from the Sherman Act for
activities in compliance with the Act. Activities outside the scope of immunity remain sub-
ject to challenge under the full range of antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1988).
11 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 6016, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 7310, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 7364, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
12 See, e.g., H.R. 7436, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 7463, supra note 10.
13 See, e.g., H.R. 7364, supra note 11; H.R. 7436, supra note 12; H.R. 7463, supra note
10; 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 104-05.
14 See, e.g., H.R. 2326, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
15 H. REP. No. 629, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2467,
2471.
16 The grandiose expectations of Congress are set forth in section 102 of the Act
which states:
(a) The Congress finds that-
(1) United States exports are responsible for creating and main-
taining one out of every nine manufacturing jobs in the United States
and for generating one out of every seven dollars of total United
States goods produced;
(2) the rapidly growing service-related industries are vital to the
well-being of the United States economy inasmuch as they create jobs
for seven out of every ten Americans, provide 65 per centum of the
Nation's gross national product, and offer the greatest potential for
significantly increased industrial trade involving finished products;
(3) trade deficits contribute to the decline of the dollar on inter-
national currency markets and have an inflationary impact on the
United States economy;
(4) tens of thousands of small- and medium-sized United States
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thusiasm for the Act is reflected by its unanimous passage.
Congress chose to combine many of the features of the prior
draft legislation in this area. With powerful and persistent legislators
backing efforts in several different committees to amend the jurisdic-
tional provisions of the Sherman Act to allow bank participation in
export trading activities, and to allow exporters to get government
certification and immunity for proposed export conduct, Congress
concluded its three year legislative effort by incorporating all major
proposals in the ETC Act.' 7 As a result, the ETC Act of 1982 in-
cludes jurisdictional changes to the antitrust laws, new procedures
allowing bank ownership of ETCs, and antitrust immunity for certi-
fied activities.
businesses produce exportable goods or services but do not engage in
exporting;
(5) although the United States is the world's leading agricultural
exporting nation, many farm products are not marketed as widely and
effectively abroad as they could be through export trading companies;
(6) export trade services in the United States are fragmented
into a multitude of separate functions, and companies attempting to
offer export trade services lack financial leverage to reach a significant
number of potential United States exporters;
(7) the United States needs well-developed export trade in-
termediaries which can achieve economies of scale and acquire exper-
tise enabling them to export goods and services profitably, at low per
unit cost to producers;
(8) the development of export trading companies in the United
States has been hampered by business attitudes and by Government
regulations;
(9) those activities of State and local governmental authorities
which initiate, facilitate, or expand exports of goods and services can
be an important source for expansion of total United States exports,
as well as for experimentation in the development of innovative ex-
port programs keyed to local, State, and regional economic needs;
(10) if United States trading companies are to be successful in
promoting United States exports and in competing with foreign trad-
ing companies, they should be able to draw on the resources, exper-
tise, and knowledge of the United States banking system, both in the
United States and abroad; and
(11) the Department of Commerce is responsible for the devel-
opment and promotion of United States exports, and especially for
facilitating the export of finished products by United States
manufacturers.
(b) It is the purpose of this Chapter to increase United States exports of
products and services by encouraging more efficient provision of export
trade services to United States producers and suppliers, in particular by es-
tablishing an office within the Department of Commerce to promote the for-
mation of export trade associations and export trading companies, by
permitting bank holding companies, bankers' banks, and Edge Act corpora-
tions and agreement corporations that are subsidiaries of bank holding com-
panies to invest in export trading companies, by reducing restrictions on
trade financing provided by financial institutions, and by modifying the appli-
cation of the antitrust laws to certain export trade. 15 U.S.C. § 4001.
17 Only the proposal for an international antitrust commission was not enacted.
Other unimplemented proposals focused on the amendment and expansion of the Webb-
Pomerene Act and the transfer of the administration of the Webb-Pomerene Act from the
Federal Trade Commission to the Department of Commerce. The ETC Act ultimately
created an entirely new mechanism for antitrust immunity administered by the Depart-
ment of Commerce with the concurrence of the Department of Justice.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
B. The Antitrust Certification Provisions of the ETC Act
The ETC Act established a new procedure which permits per-
sons engaged in export trade to receive a certificate that sets the lim-
its of their antitrust liability before they engage in such conduct.' 8
Under Title III of the ETC Act, an exporter, group of exporters, or
export intermediary may apply to the Department of Commerce for
a certificate of review stating that specified export trade activity does
not violate the antitrust laws. The Department of Justice must con-
cur in the issuance of the certificate.
The applicant must establish that its specified export trade, ex-
port trade activities, and methods of operations will:
(1) result in neither a substantial lessening of competition or re-
straint of trade within the United States nor a substantial restraint of
the export trade of any competitor of the applicant,
(2) not unreasonably enhance, stabilize, or depress prices within the
United States of the goods, wares, merchandise, or services of the
class exported by the applicant,
(3) not constitute unfair methods of competition against competi-
tors engaged in the export of goods, wares, merchandise, or services
of the class exported by the applicant, and
(4) not include any act that may reasonably be expected to result in
the sale for consumption or resale within the United States of the
goods, wares, merchandise, or services exported by the applicant. 19
Unlike the prior antitrust export immunity provisions contained
in the Webb-Pomerene Act, 20 the ETC Act applies to the export of
both services and commodities. Eligible export trade services are ex-
pansively defined in the regulations to include:
1) business, repair, and amusement services;
2) management, legal, engineering, architectural, and other profes-
sional services;
3) financial, insurance, transportation, informational and any other
data-based services, and communication services. 2 1
The certificate of review must specify the export trade, export
trade activities, and methods of operations to which the certificate
applies; the entity to whom the certificate is issued, and its members,
if any; and any conditions imposed by the Department of Commerce
(DOC) or the Department ofJustice (DOJ) to assure compliance with
the statutory requirements of the Act.2 2 Certificate holders must file
annual reports of export activities and promptly report any changes
18 The Export Trading Company Act of 1982 also created an office in the Depart-
ment of Commerce to promote export trading companies. 15 U.S.C. § 4003 (1988). Title
II of the Act permitted bank ownership and expanded financing of export trading compa-
nies. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1843. See generally supra note 1.
19 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a) (1988).
20 Id. §§ 61-65. See supra note 10.
21 15 C.F.R. § 325.2 (1991).
22 15 U.S.C. § 4013(b) (1988).
[VOL. 17
EXPORT TRADING COMPANY PROGRAM
in certified activities. 23 The Commerce and Justice Departments may
investigate or revoke certificates which no longer meet the require-
ments of the Act. 24 The Act further specifies that certificates ob-
tained by fraud are void ab initio.25
The government is barred from bringing criminal or civil actions
against conduct covered by a certificate of review. 2 6 A private plain-
tiff is limited to actual damages in challenging conduct alleged to
violate a certificate of review. 2 7 The ETC Act shortens the statute of
limitations so that any such action must be brought within two years
of notice of the alleged violation, and in any event within four years
after the accrual of the cause of action.28 The certificate holder en-
joys a presumption that certified conduct is lawful. 29 If the certificate
holder prevails in private litigation regarding certified conduct, the
plaintiff must pay the reasonable attorney fees and the costs of the
certificate holder.30
II. Impact of the ETC Act
The ETC Act has failed to satisfy any of the inflated expectations
of Congress. The Department of Commerce has issued only 124 cer-
tificates of review through December 31, 1990.31 Twenty one of
these certificates of review have been relinquished, two were re-
voked, and two expired.
Congress appeared sincerely shocked by the virtual indifference
of the business community, which had lobbied so vociferously for the
ETC Act, to the purported benefits of the Act. A minuscule fraction
of existing exporting trading companies and export management
firms have sought certification under either the banking or antitrust
23 Id. § 4014 (a)(1)(A).
24 Id. § 4014(b)(1)-(3). See, e.g., Notice of Revocation, 52 Fed. Reg. 12,444 (1987)
(revoking certificate for failure to file annual reports).
25 15 U.S.C. § 4013(f) (1988).
26 Id. § 4016(a). The Justice Department is permitted to seek to enjoin certified con-
duct which threatens "clear and irreparable harm to the national interest." Id.
§ 4016(b)(5).
27 Id. § 4016(b)(1).
28 Id. § 4016(b)(2).
29 Id. § 4016(b)(3).
30 Id. § 4016(b)(4).
31 If anything, interest is declining in the ETC program. The number of certificates









These figures were compiled by the author from the summaries of certificates of review in
the Federal Register.
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provisions of the ETC Act.3 2 As one witness told a House oversight
committee: "It is our impression that the Reagan Administration
and the Congress believed that the 1982 Act was important legisla-
tion and we believe that they wasted several years developing it."' 3s
Several explanations help explain the mediocre response of the
business community to the ETC program. These include the dra-
matic appreciation of the dollar relative to other currencies in the
1980s, the widening trade deficit, the fear of disclosure of confiden-
tial business information to the government in order to receive certi-
fication, and the lack of a definitive precedent interpreting the scope
of the protection provided by antitrust certification. 34 The funda-
mental problems overlooked or ignored by Congress were the inabil-
ity of antitrust certification to promote either exports or jobs, the
logical inconsistency of promoting both large and small export ven-
tures through the same instrument, and the inability of American ex-
port cartels to significantly aid U.S. export performance.
A. Impact on U.S. Exports and Employment
Certified export activity has produced a negligible effect on U.S.
exports. The best claim that even proponents of the ETC program
can muster is the one that "it is conceivable that the [ETC] Act has
accounted for over one billion dollars in exports."' 35 However, even
this modest impact seems exaggerated. The $1 billion figure is an
extrapolation from reported exports totaling $300 million from ex-
port trading companies holding certificates of review, $100 million
from export trading companies receiving Export-Import Bank loan
guarantees, and a total of $85 million invested in export trading
32 Sources indicate that there are 3,700 to 3,800 export management firms. Jack G.
Kaikati, The Export Trading Company Act: A Viable International Marketing Tool, CAL. MGMT.
REV., 59, 60 (1984). A Senate Committee indicated that there were approximately 2,400
export trading companies and export management companies of which slightly more than
one hundred had sought certification under either the banking or antitrust provisions of
the ETC Act as of 1987. COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, UNITED
STATES TRADE ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 1987, S. REP. No. 85, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
33 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Government Operations of the House of Representatives,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1986)[hereinafter 1986 Oversight Hearings](testimony of Ralph
Chew, President, Chew International Group). See also id at 97 (statement of Myron Miller,
Global Trading Services)("unrealistic expectations" of drafters of ETC Act).
34 Title II of the Export Trading Company Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions and Supervision, Regulation, and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (March 24, 1987)[hereinafter Title II Hearings]; 1986
Oversight Hearings, supra note 33; Oversight of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)[hereinafter 1984 Oversight Hearings]; Export Trading Com-
pany Amendments Act of 1985: Hearing on S. 1934 Before the Subcomm. on International Finance
and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986).
35 James V. Lacy, The Effect of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 on U.S. Export
Trade, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 177, 191 (1987)(authored by former head of Office of Export
Trading Company Affairs of the United States Department of Commerce).
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companies by banks. The $1 billion figure is reached by estimating
export trade from companies with bank investment eight times the
size of the equity invested by financial institutions.3 6
The $1 billion figure means that the ETC program accounts for
an even smaller percentage of U.S. exports than the Webb-Pomer-
ene program whose failure was part of the impetus for the ETC Act
in the first place. 37 This figure further fails to account for the certifi-
cation of certain conduct previously covered by the Webb-Pomerene
Act and for the exports which would have occurred regardless of any
formal antitrust immunity.3 8
Since the publication of the $1 billion estimate, the amount of
total exports by Export Trading Companies (ETCs) has grown due
to the issuance of new certificates and the continuing exports of
goods by existing ETCs. However, the percentage of U.S. exports by
ETCs has likely decreased given the dramatic growth in the export
sector3 9 and the limited number of new ETCs.4 0 The continued
growth of total exports by ETCs since the creation of the program
still provides no information regarding the extent to which the pro-
gram generated exports which otherwise would not have taken place.
The results of the ETC program are equally unimpressive when
compared to the number of participating firms. Congress apparently
believed that the reforms implemented by the ETC Act would even-
tually encompass twenty to thirty thousand firms which had not pre-
viously exported from the United States. 4' The most recent statistics
indicate that slightly more than 4,200 firms are covered by ETC cer-
tificates of review. 42 The vast majority of these firms are covered by
36 Id. Actual export totals are unavailable since the export sales data reported to the
Commerce Department is non-public information exempt from disclosure under the Free-
dom of Information Act. Mr. Lacy, as the former head of the Office of Export Trading
Company Trading Affairs, was familiar with the actual data so his estimates are probably
accurate.
37 Webb-Pomerene associations accounted for approximately 1.5% of United States
exports in 1976. FTC Staff Analysis, Webb-Pomerone Associations: Ten Years Later 15 (1978).
38 See 1986 Oversight Hearings, supra note 33, at 35-38 (statement of Allan I.
Mendelowitz, Associate Director National Security and International Affairs Division, Gen-
eral Accounting Office, discussing the limited number of firms receiving certification that
had never exported).
39 In 1989, United States exports totalled $ 364 billion. Between 1978 and 1989,
United States exports grow at an average annual compound growth rate of 8.7%. The rate
of growth is dramatically greater from 1985 through 1989 since the United States exper-
ienced decreased exports between 1981 and 1985. See USA FACTS: AN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS COMPARISON 29 (1990).
40 See supra note 31.
41 See Export Trading Companies: Hearings and Markup Before the Subcomm. on International
Economic Policy and Trade-of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs 5 (1980)[hereinafter 1980
Markup]; 126 Cong. Rec. 23,205 (Aug. 26, 1980); 127 CONG. REC. 6,883 (1981); 128
CONG.REC. 18,083 (1982).
42 ICHNIOWSKi & BRADFORD, CIMA Seeks Antitrust Protection for Equipment Exports, 222
WASH. OBSERVER No. 3 at 7 (Jan. 19, 1989).
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virtue of their membership in trade associations.43 Prior to the ac-
tive solicitation of trade associations, the number of certified firms
was shockingly low as evidenced by the fact that in 1987, the DOC
had issued certificates covering only 307 firms. 44
. There is no evidence that certification has changed the export
performance of firms passively benefitting from certification by rea-
son of membership in a trade association holding an ETC certificate
of review. Such firms do not necessarily export as a result of the
ETC program, or do not necessarily export at all.
B. ETCs and Sogoshosas
The ETC program is incapable of promoting the development
of American general trading companies along the lines of the Japa-
nese sogoshosas which captivated the attention of Congress. The
sogoshosas have been recognized as a historical accident derived
from Japan's prior isolation from world markets, its dependence on
foreign raw materials, its desire to avoid foreign economic domi-
nance, and the need to rebuild its economy following World War
II.45 Such firms did not develop in the west because "there was no
need for them."'46
The Japanese sogoshosas are highly leveraged multibillion dol-
lar corporations with gross profit margins of 2%-5%, and profit-to-
capital ratios of well under 1%.47 While the sogoshosas are typically
highly profitable on the basis of profit-to-equity ratios, this is a func-
tion of the extreme leverage and the high degree of debt in the capi-
tal structure of the sogoshosas. 48 This leverage is, in turn, a function
of the support and ownership interests of key Japanese financial in-
stitutions which own as much as 60% of the equity of the trading
companies. 49 To create the legal environment for true sogoshosas,
43 See, e.g., Application of Non-Ferrous Founders Society, 55 Fed. Reg. 5,043
(1990)(application for association with more than one hundred members); Commerce Awards
Certificate Antitrust Protection, PR NewsWire, Oct. 21, 1988 (Award of ETC certificates to
3150 member National Tooling and Machinery Association, 67 member American Film
Marketing Association, and 268 member National Machine Tool Buildings Association).
44 Title II Hearings, supra note 34, at 3 (statement of Malcolm Baldridge). But see Elea-
nor R. Lewis, Title III of the Export Trading Company Act: A Case Study in Interagency Coordination
to Promote Exports, 5J. L. & Comm. 451,476 (1985)[hereinafter Title III](indicating issuance
of certificates to 220 entities or individual proprietors by fall of 1985).
45 Dennis Unkovic & Nancy Jean LaMont, The Export Trading Company Act of 1982: Invi-
tation to Aggressive Export Expansion, 87 DICK. L. REV. 205, 208-10 (1982)(hereinafter Invita-
tion to Aggressive Export Expansion); Robert W. Dziubla, International Trading Companies:
,Building on the Japanese Model, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 422 (1982)[hereinafter International
Trading Companies].
46 International Trading Companies, supra note 45, at 438.
47 Id. at 461; Nakai, The General Trading Companies: Their Activities and Functions in NEW
OPPORTUNITIES UNDER THE EXPORT TRADING COMPANY ACT OF 1982 31(1983) [hereinafter
The General Trading Companies)(Marubeni pretax profits of .2% of revenues].
48 International Trading Companies, supra note 45, at 456-58.
49 Id. at 463-66.
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the U.S. would be forced to amend or repeal key segments of the
antitrust, securities, and banking laws in a manner which would be
both unwise and politically impossible. 50 Not even the most ardent
supporters of American trading companies have proposed anything
so radical in connection with the ETC Act. 5 1
Congress appeared to adopt the sogoshosa as a model at a time
when the sogoshosa was increasingly being criticized as an inappro-
priate vehicle for continued profitable international trade. The
need, in Japan, for general trading companies has diminished as for-
mer sogoshosa clients have developed long-term relationships with
foreign buyers and increased their knowledge of foreign markets. 52
Such firms increasingly resent paying commissions on predictable
sales involving little risk or creativity on the part of the trading com-
pany. 53 Even the extensive business which the sogoshosas have been
able to retain has become less profitable due to the increased fixed
costs of maintaining the extensive global networks of employees dis-
tinctive to the sogoshosas. 54
The sogoshosas have sought to counter these trends through
product diversification, vertical integration, and direct foreign in-
vestment. The sogoshosas have sought to enter businesses beyond
the trading of commodity items and raw materials. The results have
been mixed. 55 The sogoshosas can be stodgy, inflexible bureaucra-
cies ill-suited to trade, sell, or manage high technology products,
consumer goods, retail operations, or goods requiring significant af-
ter-sale service and support.56
Congress may have admired the sogoshosas and their role in the
50 Nor is it likely that the United States would desire a situation where less than ten
trading companies control half of the nation's imports and exports as in the case ofJapan.
Id. at 423. See also Harold R. Williams & Gurudutt M. Balisa, The U.S. Export Trading Com-
pany Act of 1982: Nature and Evaluation, 17 J.WORLD TRADE L. 224, 230-31 (1983)(nine
sogoshosas accounted for 60% ofJapanese imports, 50% of exports, and 30% of the gross
national product in 1981).
51 See International Trading Companies, supra note 45, at 423. In addition, the United
States has sought the modification and elimination of the system of interlocking ownership
within the Japanese manufacturing sector and between the Japanese manufacturing and
financial sectors which have made Japanese general trading companies possible. See Joint
Report of the U.S.-Japan Working Group on the Structural Impediments Initiative, Tokyo,
Japan, June 28, 1990.
52 Daniel C. Bello & Nicholas C. Williamson, The American Export Trading Company:
Designing a New International Marketing Institution, 49J. MKTG. 60, 62 (Fall 1985)[hereinafter
The American Trading Company]; Invitation to Aggressive Export Expansion, supra note 45, at 242.
53 See ARAI SHINYA, SHOSAMAN: A TALE OF CORPORATE JAPAN, 46-50 (199 1)(Japanese
business novel written by director of Sumitomo Corporation criticizing bureaucratic
mentality of sogoshosas, inability to grow beyond traditional functions, and distinguishing
true spirit of entrepreneurship as beyond skills of trading companies).
54 Invitation to Aggressive Export Promotion, supra note 45, at 24 1-42.
55 See generally SHINYA, supra note 53, at 173-74; YOSHIHARA KUNIo, SOGOSlOSA, THE
VANGUARD OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY (1982).
56 Id.; International Trading Companies, supra note 45, at 472-76; The General Trading Com-
panies of Japan, supra note 47, at 28, 32.
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economic development of Japan as a world power, but it sought first
and foremost to help small and medium sized firms which did not
previously export. 57 In this respect, the rhetoric regarding the crea-
tion of American style sogoshosas appears inappropriate given the
almost complete lack of interest of sogoshosas in handling the prod-
ucts of small exporters, because of the high fixed costs and the lim-
ited profit potential of such orders.5 8
The ETC program appears destined to create the precise oppo-
site of the general trading company. 59 The ETC Act itself contains
significant restrictions which prevent the accumulation of market
power and the formation of links between banking and commerce,
which are precisely the tools that permitted the sogoshosas to domi-
nate Japanese international trade.60 The ETC program has been
used almost exclusively by small export intermediaries and by trade
associations focusing on a small group of products, industries, or
markets. 6' Those ETCs receiving certification beyond a single in-
dustry or type of product typically have been small export in-
termediaries or service providers which lack the resources to
perform the full functions of the sogoshosas. There is little in the
data to suggest that the ETC Act has caused any fundamental change
in the role of the small narrowly focused and specialized export in-
termediaries which Congress identified for treatment under the Act.
TABLE 1
ETCS BY SCOPE OF OPERATIONS
6 2
1983-86 1986-90 TOTAL
SINGLE INDUSTRY OR 40 33 73
PRODUCT GROUP
MULTIPLE PRODUCT 10 2 12
GROUPS
GENERAL TRADERS 20 19 39
57 See, e.g., 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 41, 150, 171, 259; 1980 Markup, supra
note 41, at 263. At least one Congressman thought that the ETC Act would promote the
consolidation and combination of small firms to form sogoshosa like enterprises. See 128
CONG. REC. 26,864 (1982).
58 See The General Trading Companies, supra note 47, at 31-34. Compare Think Small: The
Export Lessons to be Learned from Germany's Midsize Companies, Bus. WK. (Nov. 4 1991) at 58.
59 The American Trading Company, supra note 52, at 61.
60 Title II of the ETC Act limits bank investment to 576 of bank capital and lending to
10% of bank capital. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(14), (14)(B)(i). Title II also bars banks from
lending to a bank owned ETC on terms more favorable than with its other customers. Id.
§ 1843(c)(14)(B)(iii). The antitrust laws further prohibit the type of extensive cross-own-
ership which is so prevalent in the sogoshosas. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1988).
61 See, e.g., Janice A. Payt, How Agricultural Exporters, Cooperatives, and Joint Export Mar-
keting Groups Can Use the Export Trading Company Act, 8J. AGRIc. TAX'N. & L. 34 (1986).
62 This table was compiled from the published summaries of ETC certificates of
review in the Federal Register. The purpose of the table was to distinguish between firms
certified to trade in all products and those which voluntarily sought certification for a
narrower groups of products. Firms were classified as trading in a single or product group
if the ETC certificates of review listed only a single product group such as catfish, wood
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The American subsidiaries of existing sogoshosas have shown
no interest in certification under Title III of the ETC Act. Similarly,
the existing American grain trading firms and the large multiproduct
exporters such as General Electric have not utilized the antitrust
certification procedures. 63 At the time of the passage of the ETC
Act, American grain trading firms, American mineral trading firms,
and American subsidiaries of Japanese sogoshosas accounted for
approximately twenty nine percent of all U.S. exports. 64 The
absence of such firms from the ETC program is an important
indication of the perceived insignificance of the program. Such firms
presumably have relied solely on the jurisdictional provisions of the
FTAIA 65 to the extent they believe their export conduct has any U.S.
antitrust ramifications.
C. ETCs and Export Cartels
There is nothing in the ETC Act which suggests that it could
successfully promote export cartels to exploit foreign markets to the
advantage of the U.S. The essence of a successful cartel is the exist-
ence of sufficient market power and entry barriers to raise price and
to restrict output on an ongoing basis. 66 The ETC Act does not cre-
ate market power, nor does it create or maintain barriers to entry. It
merely permits an industry, as a matter of U.S. law, to collusively
exploit such market power abroad if it already exists. The history of
the Webb-Pomerene Act suggests that few export associations will
have sufficient global market power to exploit foreign markets. 67
The data in Table 2 indicates that the majority of the ETCs have
been export intermediaries, export facilitators, or export service
providers that do not even function as horizontal agreements be-
chips industry, lumber, medical equipment, rice, even if the industry or product group
consisted of different types of items. Firms were classified as trading in multiple products
if the certificates described less than ten such broad product categories. Firms certified to
trade in ten or more product categories were classified as general traders. In contrast, the
sogoshosas trade in up to 20,000 products.
63 Sears and First Chicago did receive certification under Title II of the ETC Act for
an export joint venture. See generally, Joseph J. Norton, The Efficacy of Export Trading
Companies and Related Legislation and Regulations, 50J. AIR L. & COMM. 865, 899-904 (1985).
64 See Alden F. Abbott, Promises Deferred, Hopes Unfufilled: A Commentary on the Export
Trading Company Act and Proposals for Reform, 17 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 525, 527
(1983)[hereinafter Promises Deferred, Hopes Unfufilled].
65 See infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
66 PHILIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 405 (1978); HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 4 (1985); LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN,
ANTITRUST § 61 (1977).
67 There are some Webb-Pomerene associations which have been able to exercise
significant market power and achieve industry objectives in export markets. See 1981 Sen-
ate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 2, at 298 (Phosrock Webb-Pomerene Association). In
addition, the motion picture industry has found its Webb-Pomerene Association useful in
dealing with foreign governments over the negotiation and administration of quotas of the
importation of motion pictures in certain countries. See 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 2,
at 363 (statement of Jack Valenti, president MPEAA).
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tween competitors, let alone function as export cartels. These type
of ETCs typically seek certification to enter exclusive or nonexclusive
vertical arrangements to represent or sell one or more of its custom-
ers' products in export markets. These type of export intermediaries
typically lack the size or prominence to become the focal point for
horizontal collusion among its customers. 68
E
TABLE 269
CLASSIFICATION OF ETC BY NATURE OF ASSOCIATION
1983-1986 1987-1990 TOTAL







Not not all ETCs consisting of horizontal combinations of
competitors have obtained certification to cover the full range of
price setting, production restriction, and policing powers normally
associated with cartel behavior. As set forth in Table 3, only slightly
more than half of the horizontal ETCs have sought certification for
such cartel behavior in foreign markets. The remainder of the
horizontal ETCs received certification for more limited activity such
as export facilitation, licensing, joint bidding, sales activity, and
information exchanges which did not necessarily involve the
complete control of prices and sales in export markets. For example,
a significant number of certificates expressly permit members of
horizontal ETCs to deviate from ETC prices at will.
TABLE 370
EXTENT OF CERTIFICATION BY HORIZONTAL ETCS
1983-86 1987-90 TOTAL
FULL CERTIFICATION 12 14 26
AS EXPORT CARTEL
CERTIFICATION 9 13 22
FOR LESS THAN
CARTEL BEHAVIOR
68 See 50 Fed. Reg. 1786, 1793 (1985)(ETC Guidelines).
69 This table was compiled from the published summaries of ETC certificates of
review in the Federal Register. An ETC was classified as a horizontal combination among
competitors if it was comprised of members which produced products or services in the
same or similar industries. The published summaries provide no information as to the
degree the members of an ETC actually or potentially compete in either domestic or
export markets.
70 This table was compiled from the published summaries in the Federal Register
where a certificate of review was issued to a horizontal combination of competitors. A
certificate was considered to constitute a full export cartel behavior only if the certificate
permitted the ETC to fully control the prices and quantities of its members' exports. Such
certification means only that the ETC is immune from United States antitrust law if it
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Few of the horizontal ETCs are in industries where there is likely
to be significant market power. In fact, a majority of the horizontal
ETCs are in the agricultural and forestry industries where the
presence of foreign producers, close substitutes, and relatively low
entry barriers suggest that significant market power would be
difficult to exercise. 7'
The amount of any potential remaining monopoly rents will be
reduced by the secret or open price reductions implemented by ETC
members seeking to increase their own sales at the expense of the
export cartel. The ETC process is not an effective mechanism for the
detection and policing of this kind of cheating by cartel members
which normally results in the demise of the cartel. 72 While ETC
certificates often establish an ETC as an exclusive joint sales
instrument, the certificates do not require the members to commit
fixed amounts for export. 73 Nor do the certificates contain any
penalties for selling outside the ETC, except the possibility of
expulsion from the ETC.74
The amount of any available monopoly rents would be further
reduced by the effectiveness of foreign competition law. The
European Economic Community (EEC) vigorously enforces its own
competition laws. 7 5 Virtually every state with a developed market
economy enforces some form of national competition law.76 The
engages in such cartel behavior in a foreign market. It does not mean that the ETC
actually engages in such behavior. Any lesser degree of certification was deemed not to be
an export cartel since members would be free to set prices and quantities of exports
without regard to the activity of the ETC itself and undercut any price or export
restriction.
71 Nineteen of the horizontal ETC certificates occurred in the agricultural, forest,
fish, seafood, or ranching industries. Two certificates covered textile and apparel products.
Five certificates related to the negotiation of transportation services.
The remainder of the certificates covered various types of machinery, tooling and
parts, metals, and miherals where the existence of significant horizontal market power is
more difficult to evaluate. However, some of these certificates involve ETCs with
enormous memberships that suggest either a healthy state of competition both in the
United States and abroad, or that the coordination of an effective cartel may well be
impossible. See, e.g., supra note 43.
72 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 66; HOVENKAMP, supra note 66.
75 The Antitrust Division has refused to certify fixed export allotments because of the
concern that a cartel operating secretively in the United States could utilize an ETC as a
way to police its domestic cartel and siphon off excess production to dump in export
markets in order to maintain supracompetitive prices in the United States.
74 Even if the ETC could "punish" the cartel breaker, the cartel breaker would always
have the option of leaving the ETC. The cartel breaker could then pursue its own price
cutting strategy unless the ETC controlled some vital aspect of the exporting process. If
the ETC did control such a bottleneck it might well be in violation of the provisions of the
ETC Act prohibiting substantial restraint of the export trade of a competitor or unfair
methods of competition against other United States exporters. See 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a)(1),
(3) (1988).
75 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, entered into force, Jan.
1, 1958, arts. 85-90, 298 U.N.T.S. II [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
76 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GUIDE TO
LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (4th ed. 1976).
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growing enthusiasm for competition law in developing countries, 77
and the former centrally planned economies, 78 suggests that there
are few desirable markets where a U.S. export cartel could operate
without serious foreign legal consequences.
The public nature of the ETC program also suggests that few
American export cartels will go unnoticed by foreign competition
authorities. Applications for certificates and summaries of
certificates are published in the Federal Register 79 with additional
details available in legal periodicals and databases. The full
certificates themselves are available in the reading room of the DOC
in Washington, D.C.80 Each certificates lists the entity or association
receiving the certificate, its members, its products or services, its
method of operations, and the export markets it intends to serve.
The degree of disclosure is substantial, and is greater than what is
required by most foreign export cartels potentially aimed at the
U.S. 8 1 Such information is easily accessible to foreign competition
authorities, and therefore certification would be avoided by any
serious cartel.
More importantly, even a program of successful export cartels
does nothing to increase U.S. employment or expand export
opportunities. A successful cartel would normally raise price and
restrict output in order to obtain monopoly profits. This could well
decrease export volume and U.S. employment although the cartel
members would be earning monopoly returns in the foreign market.
Such a strategy could be self-defeating in the long-term even in
terms of total revenue and profits. Any price increase and reduction
in output to maximize cartel revenues in the short run would make
U.S. exports less competitive with foreign alternatives and would
attract new entries in the foreign market.8 2
III. The Impact of the ETC Act on Antitrust Risks
A. Reducing Actual Risks
It appears that the business community seriously exaggerated
the U.S. antitrust risks associated with exporting.83 The majority of
77 See generally JULIAN VON KALINOWSKI, WORLD LAWS OF COMPETITION (1987).
78 See American Bar Association, Section on Antitrust Law, Comments on Draft Bulgarian
Antitrust Law, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 245 (1991).
79 15 U.S.C. § 4012(b) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 325.5(c) (1991).
80 48 Fed. Reg. 10,596, 10,598-99 (1983).
81 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMPETITION AND
TRADE POLICIES: THEIR INTERACTION 14-15, 27-38 (1984). See generally OECD COMMITTEE
OF EXPERTS ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, EXPORT CARTELS (1974).
82 Conversely, the perceived widespread existence of foreign cartels would normally
raise prices and restrict output in foreign markets increasing United States export
opportunities.
83 Competitiveness: Public/Private Initiatives in Export Promotion Programs, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade, Comm. on Foreign Affairs, House of Represent-
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certificates of review have been issued for conduct which never
raised any serious antitrust concerns. Only a handful of certificates
have been issued to producer groups or associations seeking certifi-
cation to impose significant price or production restraints in foreign
markets and to groups possessing the market power to achieve such
goals.8 4
There are six types of conduct which commonly appear in the
certificates of review.. First, a majority of the applications from ex-
port intermediaries and export facilitators seek certification to enter
into exclusive agreements with domestic suppliers and foreign ex-
port intermediaries and customers. The terms of the agreements
with suppliers are typically that the supplier agrees to use the appli-
cant as an export intermediary for any of the supplier's products.
The terms of the agreements with export intermediaries and other
representatives in the export market are typically that the applicant
agrees only to deal with that export intermediary and the export
intermediary agrees not to represent any of the applicant's
competitors.
Second, the certificates permit the use of restrictions relative to
price, territory, quantity, and customer on the condition that the re-
strictions are limited to the export market. These restrictions may be
agreed upon independently or written into the agreements men-
tioned above.
Third, many applications seek permission to discuss and ex-
change information among members of the export trading company.
This information may relate to sales, marketing strategies, costs of
transport, and even prices to be charged. However, such informa-
tion must relate to the exports and export trade activity only.
Fourth, the certificates also often grant the applicants permis-
sion to engage in export facilitation services. The specific conduct
varies between certificates but concerns such areas as acting on be-
half of suppliers in market research, documenting exports, respond-
ing to bids, negotiating with the U.S. and foreign governments over
the legal requirements of exporting and importing, negotiating
transportation contracts, and matching suppliers with buyers in the
export market.
Fifth, the applicants are commonly granted permission to estab-
atives, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1990)(prepared statement of Leslie Stroh, Publisher, The
Exporter Magazine).
84 See supra note 71 and accompanying text including Table 3. Cf 125 CONG. REC.
7,123 (1979)(failure of Webb-Pomerene Act because of lack of market power of United
States export associations). Compare 1981 Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 2, at 382
(statement of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Export Association of America
("MPEAA") describing MPEEA activities as Webb-Pomerene Association) with id. at 298
(statement of Howard Fogt describing operations of Phosphate producer's Webb-Pomer-
ene Association).
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lish conditions on the entry and withdrawal of a member from the
organization. These conditions vary widely and are listed in detail in
each certificate. The most common restriction concerns the transfer
of shares by a member wishing to withdraw.
The sixth category concerns refusals to deal. The certificates
often allow the applicants to refuse to deal with a company wanting
to export goods or services that may compete with one of its
members.
Regardless of the specific type of conduct covered in the certifi-
cates of review, the vast majority of certified conduct relates to verti-
cal restraints by export intermediaries with market power that is
scarcely appreciable. Such conduct, with or without certification,
raises few domestic antitrust concerns. Many of the certificates sug-
gest an incomplete understanding of the function of the ETC pro-
gram and perhaps a desire to somehow become recognized by the
federal government as an "official" export trading company for use
in marketing.8 5
In contrast to the small export intermediaries, which dominated
the ETC program at its inception,8 6 there has been a trend among
recent applicants toward the formation of true export joint ventures
among competitors and the certification of trade associations.8 7
These more sophisticated ETCs have used their certificates to pro-
tect relatively innovative export promotion conduct. For example,
one ETC association uses its certificate to cover the joint policing of
intellectual property rights in the motion picture industry to prevent
piracy and counterfeiting in foreign markets that would diminish the
value of U.S. motion picture exports.88 Another ETC association
used its certificate to protect joint research and development to de-
85 See, e.g., United States Business & Industry Development Service, 52 Fed. Reg.
23,580 (1987)(certification for firm providing clients with export leads from publicly avail-
able government information).
86 See, e.g., Harold Porter International, 49 Fed. Reg. 16,825 (1985); TWP Company,
Inc., 49 Fed. Reg. 5,365 (1984).
87 See supra notes 69, 70 and accompanying text.
88 See American Film Marketing Association, 52 Fed. Reg. 12,578 (1987), as amended
53 Fed. Reg. 10,267 (1988); 54 Fed. Reg. 36,848 (1989). The American Film Marketing
Association ("AFMA") received certification for activities related to:
1) Promulgating voluntary model sales contract forms among AFMA members;
2) Providing services to AFMA Members and others in arbitration of disputes arising
over the terms of licensing or sales;
3) Exchange of information among AFMA Members regarding all aspects of foreign
market conditions and customers;
4) Development and recommendation among AFMA Members of voluntary model
business practices, including methods of reducing foreign trade barriers, improving intel-
lectual property protection, and expanding markets;
5) Collection and dissemination among AFMA Members of foreign market research
information;
6) Negotiation and agreement with representatives of foreign governments and orga-
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velop packaging for cherries being exported to Japan.89 Similarly,
two different associations of cherry growers obtained certification to
jointly engage in fumigation and other activities to meet foreign in-
spection requirements. 90
All of these activities may be extremely beneficial to the U.S. and
its export competitiveness, but such activities never raised any seri-
ous antitrust risks. The type of sophisticated trade association that is
being urged to apply for an ETC Certificate already has the legal
acumen to engage in such activity if it proves to be beneficial to its
members, regardless of certification. While there may be little down-
side to obtaining an ETC Certificate, 9 ' it was never necessary in the
first place. 92 Not surprisingly, the ETC program has been shunned
by the vast majority of exporters and trade associations. 93
The nature of the certified conduct suggests that few aggressive
joint export ventures raising serious antitrust concerns have sought
certification. 94 The certification process requires an uncomfortable
degree of disclosure to customers, competitors, the U.S. govern-
ment, and to foreign governments who would become aware that a
combination of U.S. exporters may seek to collude in their market. It
nizations toward reducing trade barriers, expanding markets, and improving intellectual
property protection; and
7) Certification of AFMA members as to such matters as involvement in transactions,
evidence of ownership, and true signatures.
89 See Cherrex Corporation, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,928 (1989).
90 See California Cherry Export Association, 52 Fed. Reg. 33,465 (1987), as amended,
54 Fed. Reg. 25,317 (1989); 54 Fed. Reg. 37,015 (1989); Northwest Fruit Exporters, 49
Fed. Reg. 24,581 (1984).
91 But see infra note 105.
92 See supra note 83.
93 Id.
94 One of the first uses of the Export Trading Company Act by domestic competitors
contemplating serious anticompetitive conduct in foreign markets resulted in the only liti-
gation testing the procedures for opposing certificates of review. An association of chlor-
alkali producers obtained a certificate of review for a proposed joint venture in the export
sale of caustic soda and chlorine. 50 Fed. Reg. 4251 (1985). This application pressed the
limits of the ETC program. The industry was highly concentrated and had a history of
antitrust violations relating to domestic and international commerce. The joint venture
obtained certification for the use of an exclusive sales agent which would determine prices
and quantities for export, allocate export markets, and exchange information about ho-
mogenous products, identical to those sold in the United States. Id.
Domestic brokers excluded from the joint venture challenged the approval of the cer-
tification in Horizons International, Inc. v. Baldrige, 811 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1987). The
plaintiffs had not objected to the requested certificate or commented during the process-
ing of the certificate. The plaintiffs alleged that the certified conduct violated the stan-
dards of the ETC Act as part of an ongoing anticompetitive conspiracy within the industry,
and sought to vacate the certificate of review as issued. The court examined only the
administrative record from the agency and dismissed the complaint, holding that the deci-
sion to award the certificate was not arbitrary or capricious. The court refused to vacate
the certificate on the basis of minor irregularities in the publication of the certificate for
notice and comment. Id. at 168. On substantive grounds, the court refused to second
guess the conclusion of the Commerce Department that the export joint venture was not
likely to produce anticompetitive effects on domestic commerce or U.S. export opportuni-
ties. Id. at 168-69.
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would appear that most truly joint horizontal export agreements
have relied upon lack of detection and the jurisdictional provisions
of the FTAIA rather than the certification provisions of the ETC Act.
B. Reducing Perceived Uncertainty
The other dominant purpose behind the enactment of the ETC
Act was to "clarify" the application of U.S. antitrust law to export
conduct and to reduce uncertainty and anxiety in the export commu-
nity believed to restrain exports by small and medium sized firms.95
If the ETC Act failed to unleash the wave of exports foreseen by its
sponsors, it has done somewhat better at reducing whatever uncer-
tainty existed in the minds of the export community regarding the
application of the U.S. antitrust laws to export conduct. The provi-
sions of an ETC Certificate of Review confer total immunity from
governmental antitrust challenges for conduct specified in the certifi-
cate. 96 This includes all criminal and civil actions by the DOJ under
the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, civil actions by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) under section 5 of the FTC Act, and crimi-
nal and civil actions by state attorneys general under state antitrust
law. 97
The ETC Certificate of Review does not eliminate private anti-
trust litigation but significantly raises the risks and lowers the re-
wards of a private damage suit. A private litigant with a marginal
claim 98 must identify, document, and bring the claim within a shorter
statute of limitations. 99 The private plaintiff must then overcome a
presumption of legality for conduct covered by the certificate.' 0 0 If
wrong, the plaintiff must pay the attorney fees and the costs of the
defendant.' 0 ' Even if correct, the plaintiff may only collect actual
damages, rather than treble damages, for conduct specified in the
certificate.' 0 2
It is difficult to evaluate empirically the deterrent effect of the
ETC program. There have been no antitrust challenges to the legal-
ity of behavior covered by an ETC Certificate of Review. There has
only been one attempt to challenge the issuance of a certificate.' 0 3
95 See supra note 2.
96 15 U.S.C. § 4016 (1988).
97 Id. § 4002(7).
98 Truly frivolous claims already should be deterred by the many avenues for the
imposition of sanctions in federal litigation. See Cooter & Gells v. Hartmarx Corp., I 10 S.
Ct. 2447 (1990)(affirming award of sanctions for filing of frivolous antitrust claim even
though voluntarily dismissed); Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire, 717 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir.
1983)(analyzing range of sanctions available in federal litigation).
99 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(2) (1988).
1oo Id. § 4016(b)(3).
101 Id. § 4016(b)(4).
102 Id. § 4016(b)(1).
103 Horizons Int'l, Inc. v. Baldrige, 811 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1987). See supra note 94.
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There are several equally plausible explanations for this lack of liti-
gation. First, the ETC program may have deterred frivolous litiga-
tion as intended. In the alternative, there may have been little
likelihood of litigation for the type of conduct certified because it
never raised any serious antitrust risks in the first place. Finally, it
may be simply that the true export cartels have sought their protec-
tion elsewhere outside the scrutiny and publicity of certification.
IV. The Mischief of the ETC Program
Congress generally believed that even if the ETC program did
not help the U.S. achieve greater export competitiveness, such legis-
lation could not possibly have any harmful effects. A commentator
described the attitude of Congress toward the ETC Act as follows:
"They seem to see it as something close to feeding chicken soup to a
person suffering from a cold: It can't hurt, might help, and won't cost
much." 10 4
If this had been the case, there would be little reason to worry
about the consequences of the ETC Act since, at worst, it would
slowly sink into dormancy like its predecessor, the Webb-Pomerene
Act. Unfortunately, the ETC program has created a great deal of
affirmative mischief by amending the antitrust laws sub rosa, render-
ing hypocritical the international enforcement of U.S. antitrust law,
and altering the traditional law enforcement function of U.S. anti-
trust policy.
A. Amendment By "Clarification"
The ETC program resulted in the disturbing proliferation of
substantive antitrust standards under the guise of clarifying the anti-
trust laws and reducing uncertainty. These new standards were pro-
posed and approved by huge congressional margins without broad
public awareness or debate as to the true nature of the changes being
wrought.10 5
104 Robin Berman Schwartzman, Export Trading Company Legislation: Birds, Cannons and
Peashooters, 29 FED. BAR NEWS &J. 16 (1982).
105 Virtually every witness speaking in favor of the ETC Act referred to the need to
"clarify" the antitrust laws. See generally REAMS & NELSON, supra note 2.
Ironically, the ETC Act may have created new uncertainties. The ETC Act creates a
private right of action for single damages for competitors harmed by violations of the four
substantive standards of the Act, including "unfair methods of competition." In this re-
gard, Congress may have inadvertently created a private right of action for violation of the
standards of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act where no such right of action
had previously existed. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988). See generally Stephanie W. KANWIT, FED.
TRADE COMM'N § 1.07 (1991)(no general private of right for § 5 violations). Commenta-
tors have noted the possibility that the ETC Act may expand the standing of exporters to
challenge certified conduct where standing might not be available under the Clayton Act.
Promises Deferred, Hopes Unfulfilled, supra note 64, at 541-42; John F. Bruce &John C. Pierce,
Understanding the Export Trading Company Act and Using (or Avoiding) Its Antitrust Exemptions, 38
Bus. LAW. 975, 1011-12 (1983); Wilbur L. Fugate, The Export Trade Exemption to the Antitrust
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1. Clarification versus Immunity
The changes wrought by the ETC Act cannot be classified as
mere clarifications of existing antitrust law. The ETC Act provides
for the first time a procedure by which a party can certify in advance
that its conduct is not an antitrust violation. While private parties
can seek Business Reviews from the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department, 10 6 or Advisory Opinions from the Federal Trade Com-
mission,107 such procedures provide only a statement of the present
enforcement positions of the federal antitrust agencies and provide
no substantive immunity from governmental prosecution or private
treble damage litigation. Nor can the ETC Act be viewed as a mere
clarification of the immunity already provided under the Webb-
Pomerene Act. Congress specifically rejected amending the Webb-
Pomerene Act, and instead created a new certification procedure
granting increased antitrust immunity to a broader range of export
activities that were not exempt under the Webb-Pomerene Act.' 0 8
Many features of the ETC Act are additions to antitrust jurispru-
dence and procedure. The ETC program provides complete immu-
nity from governmental prosecution for conduct that is disclosed
and certified.' 09 Private rights of actions have been curtailed
through the preemption of state antitrust claims, a shorter statute of
limitations, a presumption of legality, the availability of single rather
than treble damages, and the availability of attorney fees and costs to
a prevailing defendant." 0  Whether these changes are described as
substantive or procedural, the ETC Act has fundamentally changed
the nature of antitrust litigation relating to export conduct as com-
pared to other areas of the antitrust law.
Clarification of legal standards and the reduction of uncertainty
Laws: The Old Webb-Pomerene Act and the New Export Trading Company Act, 15 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 673, 703 (1983).
The ETC Act also prohibits any conduct which injures a competing United States
exporter. 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a)(1), (3) (1988). This language runs counter to the trend in
the case law in which the courts have restricted the ability of domestic competitors in
domestic antitrust cases to bring private treble damages claims through narrow interpreta-
tions of standing and antitrust injury. See Atlantic Richfield Co.'v. USA Petroleum Co., 110
S. Ct. 1884 (1990); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986); Brun-
swic Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
Because of the lack of cases challenging certified conduct, these worst case scenarios
have not been considered by the courts. However, the Justice Department and the Com-
merce Department has rejected the notion that the ETC Act expands the reach of the
antitrust laws. See 50 Fed. Reg. 1786, 1791 (1985); 48 Fed. Reg. 15,937, 15,939 (1983).
See also John P. Ryan, The Export Trading Company Act of 1982: Antitrust Panacea, Placebo, or
Pitfall?, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 501, 517 (1983)(no increased antitrust risks from utilizing
ETC Act).
106 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1991).
107 16 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1991).
108 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1988).
100 Id.15 U.S.C. § 4016(a).
I o Id. § 4016(b).
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is a worthy goal if socially useful behavior is encouraged through the
legal clarification, or if greater certainty allows parties to bargain in
an intelligent fashion and price the legal risks involved in a transac-
tion. However, the clarity of the legal rule is separate from the ques-
tion of whether conduct will ever be unlawful. " ' I Clarification of the
law and reducing uncertainty to the export community have come to
mean nothing short of total antitrust immunity under U.S. law. As
one witness stated:
The primary inhibiting factor to joint activity in export trade is not
the uncertainty as to the types of effects on interstate trade that must
be shown in order to establish U.S. antitrust jurisdiction over an in-
terstate jurisdiction. Rather, U.S. business enterprises are more
concerned with the question of whether any kind of concerted action
in export trade will be prosecuted either by the U.S. government or
by private parties. 112
The clarification sought by the export community through the certifi-
cation procedure is nothing more than a conferral of absolute immu-
nity without the searching political inquiry that such a request would
normally entail. 1 3
There is a limit as to the extent that society should be willing to
go to accommodate a segment of the business community that is
either unwilling or unable to understand that the antitrust laws do
not pose a significant risk to export transactions. 1 4 This is particu-
larly true given the fact that most exporters have long since realized
that it is foreign law, rather than U.S. antitrust law, that they must
consider in an export transaction." 15
2. Prior Clarification
It appears that, whether intentionally or not, the business com-
IiI Imagine the outrage that would ensue if the business community sought legislation
that would permit the granting of securities fraud, racketeering, or hazardous waste certifi-
cate of reviews with substantive immunity and procedural protection.
112 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Hearings on H.R. 2326 Before the Subcomm. on
Monopolies and Commercial law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary 193 (1981) (statement ofJohn
McDermid) (emphasis in original). See also 1981 Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 2,
at 286. (statement of Milton Schulman that his attorneys had told him that there was very
little antitrust risk associated with the export activities, but that he still feared constant
lawyer fees and the possible risks that the government or private parties would still chal-
lenge his company's conduct).
113 See, e.g., Mark Grambergs, Comment, The Export Trading Company Act: Theory and
Application, 14 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 525, 552 (1984)(criticizing ETC Act for not granting
total immunity); Promises Deferred, Hopes Unfulfilled, supra note 64, at 554 (advocating irrebut-
table presumption of legality for certified conduct).
114 See The Export Trading Company Act of 1982: Hearings and Markup on H. R. 17999 Before
the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1982) ("perception is reality"); 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 2,
at 41 (ETC Act would provide "more positive psychology").
115 See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. See, e.g., A. Ahlstrom Oy v. EC Com-
mission [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,491 (1988)(case brought
under competition laws of European Economic Community against cartel including
United States Webb-Pomerene association for price fixing).
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munity grossly exaggerated the antitrust risks concerning export
conduct at the time of the passage of the ETC Act." 6 As a result of
changes in substantive antitrust law, jurisdictional principles, and
government enforcement policy, 17 it was highly unlikely that courts
would impose liability in a case solely involving effects in a foreign
market. After 1982, exporters had the additional protection of the
FTAIA which limited U.S. jurisdiction to those export restraints
which produced a direct, substantial, and foreseeable effect on U.S.
commerce, or on the export opportunities of a U.S. exporter." 8
Exporters could also take comfort in massive changes in the sub-
stanti)e antitrust laws. In 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court held in GTE
Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental T. V, Inc. I9 that vertical non-price re-
straints should be judged under a full rule of reason inquiry. This
holding alone effectively overruled Todhunter-Mitchell v. Anheuser-
Busch,' 20 the principal case imposing antitrust liability for export
conduct. The Reagan and Bush administrations seized on GTE Syl-
vania as the cornerstone of its enforcement policies and virtually
abandoned enforcement efforts against any vertical distribution re-
straints imposed by manufacturers either domestically or abroad.' 2'
These ongoing changes and the FTAIA have provided substan-
tial protection for the export community. The Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Company 122 utilized the FTAIA to
affirm the dismissal of antitrust claims of a former salesman who al-
leged a conspiracy to eliminate him as a source of competition for
the sale of resin in foreign markets. The court held that the alleged
conspiracy had no effect on U.S. commerce and was beyond the ju-
risdiction of the Sherman Act. 123
The other cases arising under the FTAIA have uniformly held
that there is no jurisdiction under the U.S. antitrust laws unless the
conduct produces substantial effects on the U.S. market or on the
export opportunities of a competitor. 2 4 Jurisdiction is lacking ab-
sent such an effect even where the conduct occurred physically
within the United States.' 25
116 See 1986 Oversight Hearings, supra note 33 (statement of Ralph Chew); Statement of
Leslie Stroh, supra note 83.
I 17 See U.S. DEP'T OFJUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS (1977).
118 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1988).
119 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
120 383 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
121 See U.S. Dep't of Just., Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 6,264 (1985).
122 845 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1988).
123 Id. at 813-15.
124 The In Porters, S.A. v. Hanes Printables, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 494 (M.D.N.C. 1987).
125 McElderry v. Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd., 678 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
Eurim Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)(15 U.S.C. § 7
"was intended to exempt from United States antitrust law conduct that lacks the requisite
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3. The Spread of Repeal by Clarification
The ETC program appears to have spread the concept of
amendment by clarification. In response to concerns that the anti-
trust treatment of joint ventures involved in research and develop-
ment was deterring procompetitive behavior, Congress passed the
National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 ("NCRA") to further
clarify the antitrust laws. 126 The Act mandates the application of a
full rule of reason analysis to antitrust claims involving joint research
and development. The NCRA states:
In any action under the antitrust laws, or under any State law similar
to the antitrust laws, the conduct of any person in making or per-
forming a contract to carry out a joint research and development
venture shall not be deemed illegal per se; such conduct shall be
judged on the basis of its reasonableness, taking into account all rel-
evant facts affecting competition, including, but not limited to, ef-
fects on competition in properly defined, relevant research and
development markets. 
12 7
domestic effect, even where such conduct originates in the United States or involves Amer-
ican-owned entities operating abroad.")
The most extensive discussion of the FTAIA is found in Liamuiga Tours v. Travel
Impressions, Ltd., 617 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). In this case, a foreign based tour
operator sued a United States wholesale tour operator who terminated plaintiff as its rep-
resentative in the Caribbean island of St. Kitts. The court held that there was no "jurisdic-
tional nexus" since there were no effects in the United States, and no harm to United
States export opportunities. Id. at 924-25. According to the court's interpretation of the
Act, "[I]t matters not if there was anti-competitive conduct in the United States or by
domestic corporations." Id. at 924 (citing Eurim-Pharm 593 F. Supp. at 1106). See also
Akzo N.V. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1986)(using factors in
FTAIA in patent infringement and antitrust claims relating to manufacturing fibers in the
EEC).
126 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1988).
127 Id. § 4302.
The Act defines joint research and development venture broadly to include:
any group of activities, including attempting to make, making, or performing
a contract by two or more persons for the purpose of-
(A) theoretical analysis, experimentation, or systematic study of phe-
nomena or observable facts,
(B) the development or testing of basic engineering techniques,
(C) the extension of investigative findings or theory of a scientific or
technical nature into practical application for experimental and dem-
onstration purposes, including the experimental production and test-
ing of models, prototypes, equipment, materials, and processes,
(D) the collection, exchange, and analysis of research information, or
(E) any combination of the purposes specified in subparagraphs (A),
(B), (C), and (D),
and may include the establishment and operation of facilities for the con-
ducting of research, the conducting of such venture on a protected and pro-
prietary basis, and the prosecuting of applications for patents and the
granting of licenses for the results of such venture.
Id. § 4301(a)(6).
The Act is not applicable to production joint ventures and specifically excludes from
its protection the exchange of information not reasonably required for research and devel-
opment. Id. § 4301(b). The Act further does not apply to any agreements regarding the
production or marketing of the results of the joint venture other than the protection of the
intellectual rights necessary to protect the research and development itself. Id.
§ 4301(b)(2).
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The Act also permits persons to register a research and develop-
ment joint venture with the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission in return for reducing the risk of treble damage
liability. 128 Conduct properly described in a registration is judged
under the rule of reason. 129 If the conduct in a registration is found
to violate the rule of reason, the defendant is liable only for actual
damages, rather than treble, damages1t 0 A prevailing defendant is
entitled to an award of attorney fees if the claim is frivolous, unrea-
sonable, without foundation, or in bad faith. 13 1
More recently, the Bush Administration has introduced legisla-
tion that would extend the protection of the NCRA to all forms of
joint ventures, including both production and research and develop-
ment. 132 The history of the ETC Act and subsequent "clarifications"
suggest that this pattern of fragmentation will continue with the anti-
trust laws being progressively weakened without the full legal and
political scrutiny that such changes deserve.' 33
B. Hypocrisy and Antitrust Jurisdiction
The toleration and encouragement of export cartels under the
guise of legal clarification also threatens the pioneering efforts of the
U.S. to apply its antitrust laws to international and foreign cartels
and monopolies which affect the U.S. market. It is ironic that the
U.S. has been willing to damage its trade relations with close allies
over the application of the effects test to foreign anticompetitive con-
128 Id. § 4305. A person wishing to notify the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission of such an agreement must do so within ninety days of the formation
of the joint venture. The notification must disclose the identities of the parties to the joint
venture and the nature and objectives of the joint ventures. The parties must file an addi-
tional notification within ninety days if the participants change. The parties may file addi-
tional notifications if the nature of the joint venture is enlarged. Id. § 4305(a).
The government remains free to investigate or challenge a joint venture registered
pursuant to the Act. A private party may sue for treble damages for unlawful conduct
outside the scope of the registration. A private party also may sue for actual damages
under the Act for conduct that is covered in the registration. Unlike the ETC program,
The Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission neither approve the joint ven-
ture nor certify that the notified conduct is covered by the Act. The protection of the Act
are determined only if the joint venture is later challenged on antitrust grounds.
129 Id. § 4302.
130 See id. § 4303.
131 Id. § 4304(a)(2). The attorney fees section is not dependant on notification of the
joint venture.
132 See The National Cooperative Production Act, 102d Cong. Ist Sess., 137 CONG.
REC. 6654, 6694 (1991). See also THE NATIONAL COOPERATIVE PRODUCTION'AMENDMENTS,
H.R. 1604, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); THE NATIONAL COOPERATIVE RESEARCH ACT Ex-
TENSION, S. 2322, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
133 The ETC Act also may have unintentionally expanded certain of the statutory anti-
trust immunities. Certification under Title III of the ETC Act may cover certain activities
not specifically immunized under the existing exemptions for agricultural cooperatives, 15
U.S.C. § 17 (1988), 46 U.S.C. § 3306(a)(5) (1988), and the insurance industry, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1011 (1988). In the export sector, these industries may have achieved costless expan-
sion of immunity unavailable through the normal political process.
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duct,' 3 4 while at the same time, encourages and permits U.S. compa-
nies to engage in the same conduct under the guise of export
promotion.
The continuing tension between the vigorous application of
U.S. antitrust law to import transactions and the hands-off attitude
towards collusion in U.S. export activity has produced a schizo-
phrenic enforcement policy. Because of its own promotion of export
cartels, the U.S. has vacillated in its investigation and prosecution of
cartels aimed at the U.S.; which resemble our own ETCs and Webb-
Pomerene Associations.' 3 5 Thus, the universal problem that most
nations with an antitrust policy patrol the world for conduct which
injures their own economy, but refuse to regulate their own export
activity, is further perpetuated by the U.S.'5 6
There is nothing inconsistent about the vigorous promotion of
competition and a sensible recognition of the legal and practical lim-
its of national jurisdiction and enforcement power. The inconsis-
tency arises when jurisdictional limits and the promotion of legal
certainty become an excuse for the promotion of cartels aimed
abroad. This inconsistency injures both the credibility of our na-
tional competition policy and the will to enforce our laws.
C. Administration of the Export Trading Company Program and
Antitrust Enforcement
The ETC Act has subtly changed the way the Antitrust Division
of the Justice Department enforces the federal antitrust laws. Like
the process of amendment by clarification, this change has come
about without public discussion and without a true realization of its
profound implications.
1. Law Enforcement or Regulation
The ETC program changed the role of the Antitrust Division
from that of a law enforcement agency to that of a regulator. Tradi-
tionally, firms did not need to register with the federal government,
disclose their proposed conduct, or seek permission to proceed with
a particular course of action. However, the firms bore the risk of
antitrust liability if they engaged in prohibited forms of behavior.
Actual immunity was the product of congressional action,' 3 7 orjudi-
134 See generally SPENCER WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST
LAw § 5 (1991).
135 Spencer Weber Waller, The Ambivalence of United States Antitrust Policy Towards Single-
Country Export Cartels, 10 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 98 (1989).
136 See James A. Rahl, An International Antitrust Challenge, 10 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 8
(1989).
137 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988)(exemption of labor, agricultural, and horticultural
organizations); Id. §§ 1011-1015 (exemption of insurance industry); 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292
(1988) (exemption of agricultural cooperatives).
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cial interpretation, 13 8 and not the product of individual decisions by
the Antitrust Division. Congress vested the power to issue individual
antitrust exemptions in administrative agencies with specialized
knowledge of specific industries, separated the investigative and ad-
judicative functions within the agency through the use of Administra-
tive Law Judges, and mandated the use of the Administrative
Procedures Act for agency decision making.
The DOJ and the FTC are now increasingly called upon to re-
view, approve, and guide business conduct in advance of a transac-
tion in a manner more in keeping with regulatory rather than law
enforcement norms. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requires advance
notification and review of mergers and acquisitions above certain
size thresholds.' 3 9 The Newspaper Preservation Act gives the Justice
Department final approval over the merger of the business functions
of failing newspapers. 140 Both the DOJ and the FTC actively pro-
moted the disclosure of proposed conduct through their business re-
view and advisory opinion procedures.' 4 1 Both agencies also
increasingly relied on the issuance of guidelines which are often pub-
lished following a notice and comment procedure akin to an adminis-
trative rulemaking process. 142 All of these changes are part of an
emphasis on the regulatory and economic policy function rather than
the traditional law enforcement function of the DOJ.143
The registration of cartels and their regulation aimed to achieve
social goals deemed more important than fair competition has never
been a traditional function of U.S. antitrust enforcement. This has
been the traditional approach of European competition authorities
which first require the registration of cartels and other restrictive
agreements, and then determine whether the resulting restriction on
competition is outweighed by the promotion of other social goals,
138 See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)(construing Sherman Act to exclude
anticompetitive actions by state governments); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. No-
err Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961)(construing Sherman Act to exclude agree-
ments to petition legislature for anticompetitive legislation).
139 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1988).
140 Id. § 1803.
141 See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
142 For example, in the mid 1980s, the Justice Department undertook to revise its
1977 Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations. In 1988, the Department pub-
lished the new Guidelines in draft form in the Federal Register. 53 Fed. Reg. 21,584
(1988). The Antitrust Division received extensive comments and issued final Guidelines in
late 1988. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDE-
LINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1988) (hereinafter 1988 INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES).
The Justice Department also was deeply involved in the drafting and revision of regu-
lations and guidelines for export trading companies. See 15 C.F.R. § 325 (1991); 50 Fed.
Reg. 1786 (1985).
143 The Justice Department also participates directly in regulatory and economic pol-
icy functions through advocacy before other federal agencies and the role of the Economic
Policy Office of the Antitrust Division which provides expert advice throughout the Execu-
tive Branch on matters of competition and economic policy.
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such as market development, increased employment, or the promo-
tion of technical progress. 144
The traditional function of the Justice Department has been to
investigate and prosecute violations of federal civil and criminal law.
The Antitrust Division applied these principles in competition cases
to determine if an agreement between competitors unreasonably re-
stricted competition. In the case of price fixing, market allocation,
and customer allocation between competitors, such agreements are
presumed unreasonable and the Antitrust Division only needs prove
the existence of the unlawful agreement. 45 For other agreements,
the Antitrust Division needs prove that the agreement unreasonably
restricts competition by examining both the procompetitive and an-
ticompetitive effects of the agreement in an economically relevant
market. ' 4 6
It has not been a defense under U.S. antitrust law that the cartel
set reasonable prices or acted fairly. 14 7 It is similarly no defense that
the cartel served socially worthwhile purposes.148 The only question
asked in the antitrust context has been whether the agreement in
question promoted or injured competition.' 4 9
The ETC Act draws the Antitrust Division away from this tradi-
tional approach to antitrust enforcement and makes it a partner in an
effort focusing on export promotion. ' 5 0 The impact of the decisions
that the Antitrust Division is forced to make under the ETC Act is
144 See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 75 art. 85(3). See also Restrictive Trade Practices
Act of 1976, 1976 c.34 (Great Britain). See generally WILLIAM ALLAN & GERARD HOGAN,
COMPETITION LAWS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND REPUBLIC OF IRELAND § 4 (1990)(discussing re-
gistration of restrictive agreements and acceptance on public interest grounds). While the
United States appears to be moving toward a notification system based on control of
abuses of power, the nations of the European Economic Community, the European Free
Trade Association, and the emerging market economies in Eastern Europe appear to be
moving away from this system and towards stricter rules of prohibition in both their com-
petition law and enforcement policies. See Kurt Stockmann, Trends and Developments in Euro-
pean Antitrust Laws, presented at the 1992 Fordham Corporate Law Institute.
145 United States v. Socony Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150, 225-26 n.59 (1940).
146 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Chi-
cago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 58-60 (1911).
147 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927); United States
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290, 340-41 (1897).
148 Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 493 U.S.
411 (1990); National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1978).
149 National Society of Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 695. This is not to say that as a
matter of prosecutorial discretion that the Antitrust Division could not consider non-com-
petition arguments in choosing to allocate its scarce resources. Similarly, this doctrine of
statutory interpretation would not prohibit the President from preventing the Antitrust
Division from proceeding with a meritorious case which would otherwise injure the inter-
ests of the United States. See 1988 INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 142,
§ 5 n.171.
150 See 50 Fed. Reg. 1,786, 1,791 (1985)(ETC Guidelines contrasting purposes of ETC
Act with general purposes of section 5 of the FTC).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
more than just whether it regards the conduct as within the jurisdic-
tion of the U.S. antitrust laws. The concurrence of the Antitrust Di-
vision confers a grant of immunity from governmental prosecution,
places a limitation on private actions, and puts the imprimatur of the
federal government on the proposed export conduct. The continua-
tion and expansion of this approach to the control of collusion re-
quires substantial debate and scrutiny as to the desirability of
regulation over prosecution in implementing the competition policy,
and as to the wisdom of allowing the Antitrust Division to grant im-
munity for socially beneficial conduct.
2. Problems of Dual Enforcement
There are additional practical problems associated with the dual
enforcement of the ETC program. The involvement of two agencies,
the DOJ and the DOC, is the main cause for inefficiencies and delays
in the administration of the program. An applicant often gets caught
in the middle of a larger struggle between the two agencies over pol-
icy questions that go beyond the individual application being consid-
ered. While staff of the two agencies do not typically clash as result
of personal animosity, they have fundamentally different missions.151
This inherent conflict of interest was left unresolved by Congress in
creating the certification process for the ETC program. 152
The Antitrust Division, as part of the DOJ, is a law enforcement
agency charged with the investigation and prosecution of criminal
and civil antitrust violations. It is not a regulatory nor a promotional
agency. In contrast, the DOC is the principal cabinet department
charged with the promotion of American business in both domestic
and foreign markets. The Department is further charged by Con-
gress with the task of promoting export trading companies.' 53 In
this role, the DOC has been a frequent critic of the antitrust laws and
of their perceived effect of diminishing the vitality of American com-
petitiveness in international markets.' 5 4
151 See generally Title III, supra note 44 (detailing working relationships and areas of
disagreement between two agencies in administration of ETC Act); 1984 Oversight Hear-
ings, supra note 34, at 20-28 (testimony of Charles Warner, Office of Export Trading Com-
pany Affairs, Department of Commerce)(Commerce Department most aggressive of all
ETC related agencies given promotional rather than law enforcement role). In fact, the
Justice Department minimized the possibility of personal conflicts by hiring a well
respected former Commerce Department attorney to head up the review of ETC Certifi-
cates in the Antitrust Division. Title III, supra note 44, at 476.
152 1981 Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 2, at 334, 349.
153 15 U.S.C. § 4003 (1988).
154 See Study Shows Low-Value Imports Responsible for U.S. Telecommunications Trade Deficit, 7
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1309 (1990)(recommending reforming antitrust laws to assist
U.S. competitiveness); The MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour, June 26, 1989 (transcript available
on NEXIS)(statements of Secretary of Commerce Mosbacher recommending easing of an-
titrust laws to aid U.S. competitiveness in world markets); Baldrige, Leading the Way to
2000, 10 Bus. AM. 7 (1987)(supporting relaxation of antimerger laws); High-Tech, Computer
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The dual agency approach has produced considerable friction.
The DOC has found itself in the awkward position of promoting the
ETC program to a largely indifferent business community. In seek-
ing to drum up business, the DOC is selling the ETC program to
export related businesses who have not necessarily thought through
the antitrust implications of their conduct, or the need for certifica-
tion. 155 The resulting applications for certification tend to be vague
and unfocused, as the applicant seeks certification for a wide variety
of contingencies, rather than for concrete actions that raise antitrust
concerns.15 6
The DOC has the incentive to expand its interpretation of the
ETC program in order to satisfy its export promotion function and
make the program more attractive to the business community. In
seeking to expand the scope of certifiable conduct, the DOC plays a
role that necessarily conflicts with the Antitrust Division's role as the
principal antitrust enforcer. Substantive conflicts over the scope of
U.S. antitrust jurisdiction and over the statutory definitions of the
ETC Act have arisen in diverse issues such as whether Certificates of
Literacy, Deregulation Called Crucial for U.S. Survival in Trade, 3 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 825
(1986)(Assistant Secretary of Commerce calling for revision of antitrust laws to promote
capital formation and increased trade); Baldrige Says Trade Deficit Outlook for 1986 is 'Clouded,'
Could Be About the Same as 1985, 3 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 301 (1986)(Secretary of Com-
merce discussing need to make antitrust laws "compatible with today's world"); Adminis-
tration Unveils Reform Package Aimed at Revised Import Relief Foreign Trade Law, 3 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 268 (1986); Customs-F.A.S. Deficit For November Expands $12.3 Billion, Commerce
Department Reports, 3 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 62 (1986)(Secretary of Commerce Baldrige
urging updating antitrust laws); August Merchandise Trade Deficit Narrows as Imports Decline,
Exports Hold Steady, 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1241 (1985)(Secretary of Commerce Bal-
drige requesting presidential review of outmoded aspects of antitrust laws); Correspon-
dence from Malcolm Baldrige to Senator John Heinz, 1981 Senate Report, supra note 3, at
22-23.
155 The Commerce Department must undertake such promotional activity to fulfill its
mandate under Title I of the ETC Act. The Commerce Department promoted the ETC
program through extensive conferences, individualized counseling sessions, and the distri-
bution of tens of thousands of brochures, information kits, Guidebooks, and Manuals for
Professionals working in the field. ETC Promotional materials from the Department of
Commerce include THE EXPORT TRADING COMPANY GUIDEBOOK (1987); Contact Facilitation
Services For Export Trading Companies (1983); Export Digest USA (July 1983); Export Trading
Companies, A New Look for American Business, BUSINESS AMERICA (Oct. 18, 1982); ETCs-
Your Passport to Profits (1982). See generally Oversight of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982,
Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade, Comm. on Foreign Affairs, H.R. 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. at 2-11 (June 20, 1984) (Testimony of Charles Warner, Director, OETCA, Depart-
ment of Commerce). These efforts were targeted at existing Webb-Pomerene Associa-
tions, accounting and law firms servicing the export community, and trade associations. See
also 1986 Oversight Hearings supra note 33, at 35-38 (statement of Allan I. Mendelowitz,
General Accounting Office). The former head of the Office of Export Trading Company
Affairs has admitted that the Commerce Department would not dissuade an ETC applicant
even if the Department believed that certification was unnecessary. Id. at 33. One ob-
server indicated that the Department's promotional activity seemed likely to benefit pri-
marily attorneys and consultants rather than exporters. A. Paul Victor, The Export Trading
Company Act of 1982: New Antitrust Protection for Exporters (And New Opportunities for Lawyers),
52 ANTITRUST L.J. 917, 934 (1983).
156 See supra notes 62, 69, 70 and accompanying text.
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Review should have automatic expiration dates,' 57 whether the sale
of goods and services to foreign citizens in the U.S. constitutes an
"export,"' 58 what is the potential protection of a Certificate of Re-
view in connection with exports financed by the U.S. government,
159
what is the degree of acceptable exchange of information among
competitors, 160 and whether an ETC can require fixed quantity ship-
ments by its members.' 6'
The DOC also tends to become the advocate for the applicant in
negotiating with the Antitrust Division over the scope of the ETC
Certificate of Review. This exacerbates the conflict of interest be-
tween the two agencies as each views the other's positions with the
suspicion that the program is being schemingly tilted in a particular
direction. 162
3. Resource Allocation
The processing of ETC certification applications has practical
implications for the Antitrust Division. Each application is time con-
suming and must be processed within narrow statutory
timeframes.' 63 These burdens were at one time minimized by the
coordination of all ETC certificates by the Foreign Commerce Sec-
tion of the Antitrust Division. The Foreign Commerce Section of the
Antitrust Division was the focal point for the development of a con-
sistent approach to share with the Commerce Department over the
many common issues presented by all ETC certificates, and was inti-
mately involved in the drafting of the ETC Guidelines and Regula-
tions issued by the Commerce Department. 164
157 See Title III, supra note 44, at 469.
158 For example, the ETC program could be substantially expanded if the sale of
products or services to foreign citizens travelling in the United States were classified as an
export. The case law does not support this classification, especially in relation to practices
which may affect United States competitors seeking the same sales opportunities. See, e.g.,
Harris v. Duty Free Shoppers, Ltd., 940 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1991)(price discrimination
challenge to payments to tour companies to steer Japanese tourists to defendant's duty
free store); Sakamoto v. Duty Free Shoppers, Ltd., 613 F. Supp. 381 (D.Guam 1983)(chal-
lenge to exclusive contract for duty free shop at airport); Dolphin Tours, Inc. v. Pacifico
Creative Service, Inc., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,635 (1983). While ETC certificates
have been issued for duty free stores selling to outbound passengers at the borders of the
United States, such certificates appear to be the product of the unique customs status of
duty free stores, rather than any general definition of exports for ETC Act purposes. See
50 Fed. Reg. 1786, 1797 (1985)(ETC Guidelines regarding certification of duty free mer-
chandise sales).
159 Title III, supra note 44, at 470.
160 Id.
161 See supra note 73.
162 There is anecdotal evidence that each Department has agreed to language in a
particular certificate and then sought to reintroduce new and more favorable language in
dealing with attorneys of the other Department on later certificates.
163 See Title III, supra note 44, at 457-58, 468-69. (discussing difficulties of coordination
of review between Justice and Commerce within statutory time frame).
164 Id. at 456.
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More recently, the Antitrust Division has assigned the analysis of
ETC applications to the litigating section with overall responsibility
for the industry covered by the application.' 6 5 The analysis of a pro-
posed certificate now involves a staff attorney taking the time to un-
derstand the intricacies of the ETC Act, the details of the application,
the structure of the industry involved, the nature of the proposed
conduct, and its likely competitive consequences. The staff attor-
ney's work typically will be reviewed by an economist, a section chief
(and possibly an assistant section chief), an attorney in the opera-
tions section, an attorney in the Foreign Commerce Section, and a
final review by a Deputy Assistant Attorney General (and possibly the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of'the Antitrust Division). 166
Unless the same staff attorney is assigned another ETC certificate,
the entire process must be repeated with each new application. This
time consuming endeavor burdens the caseload of staff attorneys
who must otherwise conduct grand jury investigations, conduct civil
antitrust investigations, prepare cases for trial, and investigate and
potentially prosecute complicated merger investigations where time
is of the essence. 167
V. A New ETC Program or No ETC Program?
The question remains as to what should be done with a legisla-
tive program whose purposes were unfocused and contradictory,
whose foundations were empirically shaky, whose performance has
been poor, and which has produced some undesirable side effects.
One solution is to do nothing and allow the ETC program to slide
into relative obsolescence. The other solution is to confront the core
evils of the legislation and eradicate them.
A. Abolishing the ETC Program
In view of the inability of the ETC program to generate exports
and the unhealthy side effects that the program has produced, the
most effective action would be simply to abolish the ETC Program
altogether, and phase out the existing certificates over a period of
years. Congress should simply acknowledge that it had been sold an
unneeded program on false pretenses and end this unsuccessful ex-
periment. Exporters could still rely on the FTAIA to distinguish
matters subject to the U.S. antitrust laws from matters more appro-
priately the concern of foreign competition authorities.
165 1984 Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 92 (testimony of Charles F. Rule, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice).
166 Title III, supra note 44, at 468.
167 In addition, the review of an ETC certificate is viewed as considerably less interest-
ing, less prestigious, and less likely to lead to advancement within the Antitrust Division
than traditional law enforcement activities.
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The abolition of the ETC program would once again make U.S.
antitrust law simple and consistent. The Antitrust Division could fo-
cus on its traditional role of case investigation and prosecution,
rather than continue as a reluctant regulator and antagonist to the
Commerce Department in the field of export promotion. The Anti-
trust Division could then target its international enforcement efforts
at those international cartels which harm the U.S. domestic economy
or U.S. export opportunities.168
The outright and unilateral abolition of the ETC program is
probably unrealistic. The institutional and bureaucratic interests of
the Department of Commerce constitute a powerful lobby for the
preservation of its central role in the promotion of U.S. exports. The
business community that persuaded Congress to enact the ETC Act a
decade ago and the existing certificate holders would be reluctant to
abandon the procedural advantages of the ETC Act and whatever
limited advantages reaped in their export promotion activities.
While unilateral repeal may not be possible, there may be inter-
national fora in which the U.S. may be able to bargain away the ETC
program in return for valuable concessions which may make repeal
of the ETC Act politically advantageous to the U.S. Although there
may be few successful export cartels operated under the ETC pro-
gram, U.S. cartels are still a matter of concern to foreign govern-
ments since competition authorities must expend valuable resources
monitoring the operations of both American ETCs and Webb-
Pomerene Associations. 16 9
The abolition of both the ETC Act and the Webb-Pomerene Act
may be most valuable as a bargaining chip in international negotia-
tions regarding the legitimacy and abolition of export cartels as a
tool of international trade. The lack of international consensus and
the absence of international regulation pertaining to the use of ex-
port cartels leaves a conspicuous gap in the enforcement of competi-
tion norms. 170 Like the U.S., most nations assert jurisdiction over
injurious conduct taking place outside their territory under some
version of the 'effects' doctrine, but tacitly or openly approve of ex-
port agreements which injure only foreign markets.
168 Following past vacillation on this point, the Antitrust Division recently has an-
nounced its interest in investigating foreign restraints on United States export opportuni-
ties which fall within the jurisdiction of the United States antitrust laws. See Dick
Thornburgh, Attorney General of the United States, Remarks to the American Stock Ex-
change Tenth Annual Washington Briefing (Oct. 15, 1990); Michael Boudin, Deputy As-
sistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Remarks before the Southwestern Legal
Foundation (June 19, 1990).
169 See, e.g., supra notes 75-78. See also Ansac Decision 91/301, The Commission of the
European Communities(Dec. 19, 1990) (refusing American Webb-Pomerene Association
exemption under EEC competition law to jointly sell members' products in Community).
170 See Symposium, An InternationalAntitrust Challenge, 10 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 149
(1990).
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International negotiations could sharpen the transparency in the
use of export cartels and make important information available at the
international level to injured nations. More ambitious agreements
could include the eventual prohibition and abolition of export cartels
or provisions strengthening the cooperation of national govern-
ments in the investigation of such cartels, and thereby legitimize the
use of countermeasures in markets affected by the export cartel.
The problem of export cartels can also be attacked as an interna-
tional trade problem under the auspices of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").1 7' The close relationship between
international trade and antitrust policy suggests that competition is-
sues may well be the next non-tariff barrier addressed in multilateral
trade negotiations.' 72 The promotion of export cartels to alter the
terms of international trade to a country's mercantilistic advantage is
as much a non-tariff barrier to free trade as the use of 'unfair' trade
practices such as dumping and subsidies.173 The development of in-
terpretive side agreements under the GATT governing dumping and
subsidies could serve as a model for a similar agreements regarding
export cartels. 174 Although the GATT Antidumping and Subsidies
Codes do not address the abolition of these practices, both Codes
define the trade practices deemed unfair, provide detailed proce-
dures for countermeasures by nations injured by the practices, and
establish dispute resolution procedures at the international level. 175
Regardless of the forum for these negotiations, such negotia-
tions could prove beneficial to the U.S. The exposure, regulation,
and potential abolition of national export cartels, and the legitima-
tion of measures to counter the actions of foreign export cartels are
worthy tradeoffs for the abolition or curtailment of the ETC program
which never served the interests of the U.S. in the first place.
B. Revamping the ETC Program
If the unilateral or negotiated abolition of the ETC program is
not deemed possible, concrete steps can be implemented to improve
171 General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194.
172 See Commission Analyzes Problems Posed in Post-Uruguay Round Era, 8 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1405 (1991). See generally SPENCER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTI-
TRUST (1992); MARIO MENDES, ANTITRUST IN A WORLD OF INTERRELATED ECONOMIES
(1991).
173 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (d)(3)(B)(i)(II) (1988)(defining foreign toleration of system-
atic anticompetitive practices by private firms as grounds for trade retaliation by United
States).I 174 Agreement on the Implementation of art. VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, April 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents,
26th Supp. 171 (1980); Agreement on the Implementation of arts. VI, XVI, XXIII of the
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, April 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, 55 U.N.T.S.
194, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 26th Supp. 56 (1980).
175 Id.
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the ETC program. Both substantive and procedural changes could
be implemented to promote U.S. exports, decrease the administra-
tive burden of the program, and preserve the traditional nature of
U.S. antitrust enforcement.
Changes should be made to the ETC program to minimize the
regulatory burden it imposes on both the Department of Justice and
the Department of Commerce. Both agencies should work toward
developing a standard certificate of review for the small and medium
sized export intermediary which is the typical ETC applicant. There
is little that a genuine export intermediary can do with regard to
overseas markets which will constitute a violation of U.S. antitrust
law. A standard certificate of review could be developed by the agen-
cies for specified export trade activities, methods of operations, and
conditions covering the typical vertical restraints granted to export
intermediaries. 176 The draft certificate could be placed in the federal
register for comments, and then published in final form for use by
the business community.. Such an approach has the added benefit
that it can be implemented without additional congressional action.
The business and legal community could then utilize the stan-
dard certificate for applications on behalf of export intermediaries
desiring the "usual" protection already granted to most competitors,
without having to start each certificate application from the very be-
ginning. The DOJ and the DOC could then approve such applica-
tions without the individual scrutiny currently given to applications
for certificates. While the Departments would have to assure that the
applicant fits the criteria of the standard package, the time and ex-
pense for preparing such applications for agency review would be
drastically reduced.
Detailed agency review could be reserved for applications re-
questing certification for novel export trade activities, methods of
operations, or true horizontal export joint ventures. Applicants
could request any type of certificate, but would remain subject to
more individualized scrutiny for any request that does not fall within
the purview of the standard certificate.
The costs and burdens to both the applicants and the govern-
ment could be further lessened through congressional adoption of a
notification, rather than a certification, procedure for export activi-
ties. Under such an approach, applicants would simply notify the
DOC and the DOJ of proposed export conduct and agreements.
The notification would not require analysis or approval by either the
DOC or the DOJ and would automatically invoke the procedural pro-
tection of the current ETC Act unless a private party could establish
176 Such efforts would be a more comprehensive and more formal version of standard-
ization efforts already undertaken by the Commerce and Justice Departments in adminis-
tering the ETC program. Title III, supra note 44. at 471, 473.
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that the registered conduct fails to conform to the substantive re-
quirements of the Act. Applicants desiring full immunity from gov-
ernment prosecution available under the current ETC Act could still
apply for a certificate.
The notification procedure would eliminate several defects of
the current system. Initial costs and time delays for routine requests
involving vertical non-price restraints and export intermediaries with
little market power would be greatly reduced. The applicants would
probably opt to unilaterally prepare a notification rather than partici-
pate in a complex regulatory procedure involving two federal agen-
cies. Such an option would be most attractive for applicants with
limited resources who are engaged in export conduct raising little
risk of government enforcement actions, but who desire procedural
protection in the event of private litigation.
In using the notification process, the only burden on the parties
would be to articulate their proposed export trade activities and
methods of operations with sufficient clarity so that a reviewing court
would be able to ascertain that the challenged conduct was covered
by the notification, and therefore complied with the ETC Act. The
scope of the notification and the degree of disclosure would be en-
tirely up to the applicant. A summary of non-confidential informa-
tion could be published in the Federal Register in a manner similar
to registrations filed under the NCRA.t 77 The shorter statute of lim-
itations, single damages, and the availability of attorney fees would
discourage frivolous challenges under a notification scheme. If an
applicant felt that risk of government antitrust enforcement was
high, it could apply for actual certification under the current pro-
gram or seek the views of DOJ and FTC, pursuant to the Business
Review and Advisory Opinion procedures.' 78 Notification would
lessen the administrative burdens on both Departments and allow
them to pursue their traditional functions without diverting scarce
resources towards analyzing specific export ventures and negotiating
individual export ventures.
VI. Conclusion
The ETC Act has failed to significantly increase U.S. exports or
to restructure the export sector. The principal problem has been the
contradictory goals of the drafters of the legislation. No legislative
package could simultaneously promote: 1) the formation of verti-
177 See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
178 The ETC Act should be amended to require an application fee for any applicant of
substantial resources who desires full individualized review and actual certification con-
suming substantial agency resources. Consistent with the ETC Act's focus on the promo-
tion of exports by small and medium sized firms, a sliding scale of application fees based
on size could be adopted with an exemption of application fees for export trade companies
below specified thresholds.
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cally integrated and heavily capitalized American trading companies
along the lines of the Japanese sogoshosas, 2) the formation of joint
export ventures among small and medium sized firms, and 3) the
formation of American export cartels.
There was little chance that U.S. export activity could be ener-
gized by changing antitrust jurisdictional principles or by creating an
antitrust certification procedure. The export community and Con-
gress merely seized on U.S. antitrust laws as a strawman, instead of
addressing the more fundamental problems that impede U.S. export
activity.
The ETC Act has led to the evolution ofjurisdictional concepts,
substantive antitrust law, and government enforcement policy in a
manner that reduces the risk of antitrust prosecution and treble dam-
age liability far below other legal risks faced by exporters. The illu-
sory search for total legal certainty has weakened the fabric of
antitrust law and has also obstructed the enforcement mission of the
Antitrust Division of DOJ.
By continuing the process of amendment of the antitrust laws by
"clarification" to appease the export community, we run the risk of
further weakening antitrust enforcement without receiving any cor-
responding domestic benefit. The greatest advantage to the U.S. will
come through the abolition or control of all export cartels, both U.S.
and foreign, through international agreements or regulations. If
such agreements are not forthcoming, the U.S. should unilaterally
revamp the ETC program to minimize the damage done to the sub-
stance and enforcement of U.S. antitrust law.
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